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1. Introduction 
Agri-environment schemes were introduced into the Common agricultural policy (CAP) in 
1992  as  a  financial  instrument  to  support  farming  practices  contributing  to  protect  the 
environment and to preserve natural resources. They are based on  the voluntary provision of 
environmental services (above and beyond the regulatory duty of care level) by farmers on 
their private land in return for a compensatory payment by the EU and the member state. 
Agri-environmental measures are the object of a contract between individual farmers and the 
environmental service purchaser (the state or the environmental public authority), specifying 
the  actions  that  should  be  undertaken,  the  contract  length,  the  control  method  and  the 
payments made to farmers.  
 
Since the environmental benefits of such contracts have no market price, the question of how 
much  farmers  should  be  paid  to  provide  such  services    remains  open.  The  European 
Commission has privileged an approach based on the compensation of farmers’ compliance 
costs: member states are required to calculate a payment which covers the additional costs 
associated with the adoption of the environmental-friendly practice or action, both in terms of 
financial costs (more expensive inputs, additional labour, investments in new equipment) and 
in terms of potential revenue losses (due to lower yields, lower farming intensity or lower 
quality of output). This payment principle is therefore founded on the expected willingness to 
accept by farmers who are the suppliers of the environmental service. However, since the net 
costs of technology switching is farmer’s private information, payments cannot be perfectly 
tailored  to  reflect  the  true  compliance  costs  of  each  individual  farmer.  They  are  thus 
calculated on the basis of the estimated costs of a representative farm at the national level, 
sometimes adjusted to reflect regional characteristics. Therefore payments do not take into 
account  cost  heterogeneity  across  farmers  due  to  nature  of  soils,  location  of  farm  plots, 
farmers’ technologies and know-how. They are uniform payments per environmental action. 
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Another approach would be to calculate farmers’ payments on the basis of  the willingness to 
pay  by  society  for  the  service  provided.  Farmers  providing    environmental  benefits  with 
greater  value  would  thus  get  higher  payments.  Payments  would  reflect  the  environmental 
demand characteristics instead of the environmental supply characteristics. It is less easy to 
implement  since  it  requires  to  measure  or  reveal  such  willingness  to  pay.  It  is  not 
implemented  as  such  in  practice.  However,  it  is  worth  mentioning  that  the  European 
Commission  has  partially  adopted  this  demand-side  approach  in  its  recommendation  to 
provide a premium payment over and above calculated costs to farmers who are located in 
environmentally-sensitive areas (such as Natura 2000 zones, and priority zones of the  water 
framework directive). It is in effect a way of reflecting in agri-environmental payments the 
priority that society gives to environmentally vulnerable areas. 
 
The  third approach is disconnected from environmental supply or demand considerations. It 
consists in establishing agri-environmental payment rules on the basis of farmers’ needs for 
income support. Agri-environmental payments often represent a non negligible –and secure- 
source of farm income and have contributed to maintain farming in less favourable areas. It is 
a fact that agri-environmental policies have often been used by member States to supplement 
farm income, in a way which was compatible with the decoupling requirements of the World 
Trade Organization. This is easily revealed by the analysis of agri-environmental measures 
selected by regions: regions wishing to support farm income tend to design measures which 
require a minimum effort from farmers, therefore creating windfall income effects without 




Hence, although closely supervised by Brussels, payment rules vary from one member State 
to another, often reflecting the relative weights that national decision-makers give to these 
three  approaches:  the  compliance  cost  rule  (supply  side),  the  environmental  service  rule 
(demand side), and the needs rule (income support). The ambiguity about the true objectives 
of agri-environmental scheme (genuine environmental concerns or income-support) explains 
partly the disappointing results of the evaluation conducted by the EC (CE, 2005; Primdahl et 
                                                 
1 The French Grass Premium is explicitly “the Prime Herbagère Agri-Environnemental (PHAE)”. It is intended 
to livestock breeders.   3
al, 2003), which pointed out the insufficient environmental outcomes of agri-environmental 
payments.  
 
To respond to these shortcomings, and following an audit of the European Court of Auditors, 
the  European  Commission  has  thus  required  that  agri-environmental  schemes  include 
quantifiable objectives and be more cost-effective. It has suggested that new allocation rules 
for  agri-environmental  contracts  -  such  as  competitive  bidding  –  should  be  designed    to 
improve their efficiency (Journal Officiel de l’Union Européenne, 2005). Therefore a debate 
will  arise  about  the  design  of  agri-environmental  contracts  and  the  calculation  of  agri-
environmental payments. The existing European agri-environmental scheme, based on a menu 
of  technical recommendations associated with uniform payments, might evolve to include 
individually-designed packages with farm-fitted measures and differentiated payments. Since 
the acceptability of reforms by farmers is a major concern for European decision-makers, it is 
essential  to  understand  better  what  shapes  farmers’  attitudes  towards  the  design  of  agri-
environmental schemes in order to forecast better their reaction to reform.  In particular, since  
the  payment  rule  is  a  compromise  between  efficiency  objectives,  equity  concerns  and 
budgetary constraints, it is likely that it will incorporate a variable mix of the three approaches 
described above. It is necessary to find out what are farmers’ preferences over these three 
rules since it may condition –at least partially- their willingness to participate to the reformed 
agri-environmental schemes. 
 
The objectives of this paper are therefore twofold: (i) to provide insights into the way farmers 
perceive agri-environmental schemes. (ii) to design a methodology in order to measure the 
relative preference of farmers for three types of agri-environmental payments rules: payments 
based on compliance costs; payments based on environmental contributions; and payments 
based on needs for income support. This question echoes the debate on equity and justice 
principles which often defines three rules for a fair allocation: the accountability principle, the 
efficiency principle, and the needs principle (Konow, 2001). We design a choice experiment 
in  which  farmers  can  choose  between  different  payment  rules.  A  preliminary  survey 
conducted in Lozere (France) allows us to analyse with a binomial logit model how these 
preferences are  structured.  
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The main conclusion is that farmers are open to change: although the survey was conducted in 
a  region  of  extensive  livestock  production,  where  agri-environmental  measures  are 
notoriously  used  to  distribute  income-support.  Surveyed  farmers  clearly  indicate  that  they 
would favour a system which would be better tailored to the characteristics of each farm and 
which would better take into account each farmer’s true compliance costs and contribution to 
the environment.  
 
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the case study and the survey design. 
Section  3  discusses  the  results  on  farmers’  attitudes  towards  agri-environmental  schemes. 
Section 4 describes the choice-modelling survey and presents the results of the logit model on 
farmers’ preferences concerning agri-environmental payment rules. Section 5 concludes.   
 
2. The case study 
2.1. Farming systems in the Lozere area   
Since it was not possible to design a nation-wide survey, we decided on the contrary to select 
a biased sample and to target a geographical area in which farmers could be expected to be 
very reluctant to accept changes in the design of existing agri-environmental schemes. The 
underlying  assumption  was  that  if  our  survey  showed  that  farmers  in  such  area  accepted 
different  allocation or payment rules, then we could hope to find even more encouraging 
results in other French regions.  
 
Our  survey  was  thus  conducted  in  the  Lozere  department
2, located in the Massif Central 
mountain  in  the  South-East  of  France.  The  climate  is  tough  with  cold  winters  and  dry 
summers. The Lozere area is an essentially rural region of  around 5100 km
2,  of which 54% 
is farmland and the rest is mainly forests. The Lozère is characterized by low diversification 
of economic activity and is very  dependent on agriculture, although the number of farmers is 
declining rapidly (minus 13% between 2000 and 2005, Agreste 2005) due to low agricultural 
income. Extensive livestock farming is the dominant farming system, with both cattle and 
sheep: 93% of farms have an average stocking density of less than one livestock unit per 
                                                 
2 The French department is a geographical and administrative entity. There are 95 departments in France.     5
hectare. Although such extensive system does not generate much value added, it contributes 
to preserve the open landscape by maintaining large grazing areas.  
 
We selected Lozere  as the survey area for three reasons: 
·  Lozere is classified in class 5 of the 5 levels of less favoured area (LFA) defined by 
the European Commission. The average farm net income is 19 443 €, only half of the 
national average of 37 700 € (CNASEA, 2004). The CAP second pillar payments
3 
represent up to 29% of the farm net income compared to 8.6% at the national level. 
Therefore,  farmers  are  very  dependant  on  CAP  payments  designed  to  fight  back 
agricultural abandonment and to maintain the traditional landscape features. 
 
·  Farmers from Lozere have a long experience of agri-environmental contracts. Lozere 
was  one  of  the  first  regions  to  experiment  an  agri-environmental  scheme  (called 
“agricultural abandonment control”) under Article 19, in 1990 (Véron et al, 1999). It is 
also one of the area with the highest rate of farmers contracting for the grass premium 
(CNASEA,  2004):  the  grass  premium  payments  represent  86%  of  all  agri-
environmental  payments  to  Lozerian  farmers  (Agreste,  2006).  It  is  an  agri-
environmental  measure  initially  created  in  1993  to  encourage  extensive  livestock 
production on sown and natural pastures, with the stated objective of maintaining open 
landscapes and low soil and groundwater pollution levels. However, it is well known 
that  livestock  breeders  in  Lozere  only  need  to  adjust  their  traditional  practices 
marginally to comply with the technical specification of the grass premium contract. 
Therefore, contracting for the grass premium does not require much additional effort 
from  them.  The  grass  premium  typically  provides  windfall  benefits  to  Lozerian 
farmers, and is considered by decision-makers more as an income-support measure to 
prevent  land  abandonment  than  as  an  environmental  payment.  The  grass  premium 
system has been reformed several times
4: in the 2007-2013 French programme for 
rural  development,  it  has  been  included  in  the  agri-environmental  scheme  as  a 
“national measure” entirely financed by the French state. Technical recommendations 
                                                 
3 The second pillar payments (for rural development) are mainly the payments for natural handicap (in French 
the  ICHN Indemnité Compensatoire d’Handicap Naturel) and agri-environmental measures.  
4 The predecessors of current grass premium are “Prime au maintien des système d’élevage extensive” (PMSEE) 
from 1993 to 2002 and “Prime Herbagère Agri-Environnementale 1” (PHAE1) from 2003 to 2006.  
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are  designed,  and  payments  per  ha  are  calculated  uniformly  for  the  entire  French 
territory.  
 
·  Due to practical constraints, we were limited on the number of surveyed farmers. We 
chose therefore to focus on a sample with low heterogeneity. The Lozerian farmers’ 
situations  (production  system,  type  of  agri-environmental  contracts,  environmental 
problem) are adapted for a small sampling. 
 
Therefore,  Lozerian  farmers  are  familiar  with  agri-environmental  contracting  and  their 
income depends heavily on the maintenance of the CAP’ second pillar payments. They are 
mostly  used  to  a  uniform  system  in  which  all  farmers  get  the  same  payment  per  ha 
notwithstanding  their  individual  efforts  or  contributions  to  the  environment.  We  can  thus 
expect that any change in the allocation procedure of agri-environmental contracts might meet 
some opposition.   
 
2.2. Sample description and  survey design  
 Data collection was done by face to face interviews with farmers in August 2006 and they 
lasted on average one hour and a half. The questionnaire was structured into four sections. 
The first section was designed to collect data on the characteristics of the farming system and 
the farmer (production system, land use, labour use, income from other activities, gender, age, 
educational level, etc.).  The second section included  questions about the farmer’ s opinion 
concerning what should be the  objectives and targets of an agri-environmental scheme:  to 
provide income support, to maintain traditional practices, to accelerate the adoption of more 
environmentally friendly practices, etc.). In the third section, we suggested new allocation and 
payments rules and asked farmers which design they would favour, had their the choice.  The 
last section of the questionnaire is designed as a choice-modelling survey with choice cards 
allowing us to  measure farmers’ relative preferences over two payment rules: the uniform 
rule for which farmers are paid the same amount for the same action, without considerations 
for  differences  in  compliance  costs,  environmental  priorities  or  financial  needs;  and  the 
differentiated payment rules which tailors payments according to one or several of the three 
criteria just cited above. The methodology and results derived from this last part of the survey 
are presented separately in section 4.   7
 
A random sample of 32 Lozerian farmers was drawn.  Table 1 illustrates some descriptive 
statistics  of  the  sample: they reflect the general characteristics of  farmers in Lozère. All 
farmers  are  cattle  breeders,  the  average  stocking  density  is  low  (0.73  LU/ha
5)  and    agri-
environmental payments make up  for 32% of their total income. 
 
Table 1: Sample’s descriptive statistics (N=32) 




Production system  62%  beef cattle 
18% dairy cattle 
20% others 
   
Farmland  (ha)  106,17  34.7  52 
192 
Livestock density (LU/ha)  0.73  0.16  0.39 
1.1 
Other revenue (%)  Yes = 38 
No = 62 
   
Share  of  agri-environmental  payment  in  total 
income (%) 
32  20  10 
80 
 
Participation in voluntary agri-environmental schemes depends both on farmers’ attitudes and 
behavioural  responses,  linked  to  their  individual  characteristics  (such  as  age,  education, 
sensitivity to environmental  issues  and on the adequation between the contract requirements 
(such as contract length, severity of technical  specification etc.) and the farming constraints 
(Wilson, 1996; Wynn et al, 2001). Brotherton (1991), Wynn et al (2001) and Vanslembrouck 
et  al  (2002)  therefore  distinguish  the  “decision-subject  characteristics”  (i.e.  the  available 
scheme) and the “decision-maker characteristics” (the farmer) to show that the expected effect 
on  farm  production  and  income,  and  the  farmers’  environmental  attitude  are  significant 
determinants  of  the  acceptance  rate  of  agri-environmental  policies.  There  is a fairly large 
body of literature trying to measure the impact of farm size (Damianos and Giannakopoulos, 
2002), of farmer’s age (Wynn et al, 2001 and Bonnieux et al, 1998), of farmer’s education 
level (Delavaux et al, 1999 and Dupraz et al, 2002), on decisions to participate in an agri-
environmental  scheme.  Focusing  on  farmer’s  attitudes  towards  environmental  protection, 
Morris and Potter (1995) propose an interesting classification  of participant farmers: active 
participants who sign agri environmental contracts because they want to contribute to the 
improvement  of  the  environment,  passive  adopters  who  sign  agri-environmental  measures 
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only  for  financial  reasons,  conditional  non-adopters  who  would  participate  if  the  contract 
terms changed and finally resistant non-adopter, who are against such measures whatever the 
type of contract. 
 
Based  on  this  existing  literature,  the  questionnaire  was  used  to  test  3  hypothesis  on  the 
attitude  of  Lozerian  farmers  concerning  changes  in  allocation  and  payment  rules  of  agri-
environmental contracts: the confirmation or contradiction of these hypothesis will help us to 
anticipate the acceptability of agri-environmental reforms. 
 
Hypothesis 1: Lozerian farmers consider that the primary objective of agri-environmental 
schemes in their region is to provide income support. 
Hypothesis 2: Lozerian farmers prefer agri-environmental schemes with standard technical 
specification  and  uniform  payments  (existing  scheme),  to  schemes  privileging 
individually-fitted technical packages and payments. . 
Hypothesis  3:  –  farmers  favour  uniform  payments  over  differentiated  “individualized” 
payments - will be tested in section 4.  
 
3.  Factors  shaping  farmers’  willingness  to  accept  different  agri-
environmental schemes  
3.1. Farmers’ opinions on the objectives of agri-environmental schemes 
Interviewed farmers were asked to select the sentence which reflected best their opinion on 
what should be the primary objective of an agri-environmental scheme. In the case of multiple 
responses, they were asked to rank them –from the most important to the least important. For 
each alternative, we calculated two indicators (table 2): the number of times this alternative 
was selected; and a Borda score (the number of responses was weighted by their rank, from 4 
for the most important to 1 for the least important).   9
 
Table 2 : The objectives of agri-environmental measures 
Agri-environmental objectives 
Selection  rate 
(%  of 
respondents)* 
Borda  score 
(%) 
Maintain existing practices 
Agri-environmental  payments  should  target  farmers  who  have 
maintained  traditional  environmentally-  friendly  practices.  Their 
objective is to help to maintain these practices. 
69  31 
Provide income support 
Agri-environmental payments should target farmers with financial 
difficulties in naturally-handicapped areas in mountainous zones. 
Their  objective  is  to  support  farm  income  and  maintain 
agricultural activities in such area. 
50  18 
Protect  most vulnerable zones 
Agri  environmental  payments  should  target  farmers  in  priority 
zones where the environment is most at risk. Their objective is to 
protect highly vulnerable zones. 
47  16 
Encourage changes in practices 
Agri-environmental payments should target farmers  who choose 
to adopt more environmentally friendly practices. Their objective 
is to encourage changes in agricultural practices. 
75  35 
* the respondents could select several responses – the sum can therefore be superior to 100 
 
Results  from  table  2  indicate  that,  although  50%  of  interviewed  farmers  select  “provide 
income-support” as an objective of agri-environmental schemes, 75% of them cite “encourage 
changes towards more environmental friendly practices”.  The response difference between 
these  two  alternatives  is  statistically  significant  (p-value  =  0.03  in  a  two  sample-test  of 
proportions). The Borda score confirms these results:  it indicates that a change toward more 
environmental  friendly  practices  is  the  most  important  objective  (35%)  followed  by  the 
objective  of  maintaining  traditional  environmentally  friendly  practices  (31%).  Contrary  to 
hypothesis 1, the income-support justification of agri-environmental schemes is ranked before 
last  with  a  Borda  score  of  18%,  only  followed  by  the  “protect  most  vulnerable  zone” 
alternative  (16%).  However,  the  test  of  percentage  comparison  shows  that  there  is  no 
significant difference between the two alternatives (p-value = 0.57 in a two sample-test of 
proportions). 
 
3.2. Farmers’ preferences in terms of agri-environmental contract design  
The  existing  French  agri-environmental  schemes  are  based  on  standardized  technical 
specifications and uniform payments par action. However, the introduction of competitive 
bidding procedures would impose the design of more flexible agri-environmental contracts, in   10
which  either  payments,  or  technical  specifications  or  both  could  be  tailored  to  the 
characteristics of each farm. We therefore asked respondents to select (and rank by order of 
preference in case of multiple responses) their preferred type of agri-environmental contracts 
amongst four: 
Contract  A:  a  menu  of  several  agri-environmental  measures,  with  fixed  technical 
specifications and uniform payments (the current system).  
Contract  B:  an  agri-environmental  contract  imposing  specific  actions,  based  on  fixed 
technical specifications, associated to differentiated payments reflecting farm’s and farmer’s 
characteristics  (i.e  this  type  of  contract  is  used  by  the  Conservation  Reserve  Program  in 
USA).  
Contract C: an agri-environmental contract with a fixed uniform payment per ha, but with 
differentiated technical specifications, adjusted to reflect the farm’s characteristics and the 
farmer’s  preferences    (i.e.  this  type  of  contract  is  used  by  the  Countryside  Stewardship 
Scheme in Great Britain).  
Contract D: an entirely flexible contract design, in which both technical specifications and 
payments reflect the characeristics of the farm and the farmer’s preferences (i.e this type of 
contract is found in the Australian Bush Tender).  
We calculated the same indicators as in section 3.1 (table 3).  
 
Table 3 : Farmers’ preferences for agri-environmental contract types 
Agri-environmental contract type  Selection  rate  (%  of 
respondents)*  Borda score (%) 
Contract A: fixed technical specifications and payments  16  15 
Contract  B:  fixed  technical  specifications  and  differentiated 
payments  13  10 
Contract  C:  fixed  payments  and  adjusted  technical 
specifications   25  20 
Contract  D:  differentiated    technical  specifications  and 
differentiated  payments   59  55 
* the respondents could select several responses – the sum can therefore be superior to 100 
 
The results obtained were unexpected and contradicted our hypothesis 2. Contracts A and B, 
imposing  fixed  tchnical  specifications  are  only  chosen  by  respectively  16  and  13%  of 
respondents  and  cumulate  a  borda  score  of  25%.  The  preferred  contract  type  is the most 
flexible one (contract D): it was chosen by 59% of respondents with a Borda score of 55%.    11
The difference in responses between contract A and contract D is statistically significant (p-
value = 0.0003 in a two sample-test of proportions). Agri-environmental contracts based on 
fixed payment and adjusted technical specification (contract C) come second with a Borda 
score of 25%. The difference in responses for contract D and C is significant (p-value = 0.005 
in a two sample-test of proportions).  
Hence, despite the repeated claims of French farm unions for egalitarian rules in contract 
deign, it seems that farmers are rather is favour of more flexible designs reflecting better their 
differences. This result indicates that Lozerian farmers would not be put off by the outcomes 
of an agri-environmental auction: they would accept the contract heterogeneity induced by the 
competitive bidding procedure, provided it reflects their differences. 
 
Because of the limited number of observations, we can only draw partial conclusions from 
this preliminary survey. Bearing in mind that the Lozerian agriculture is extremely dependent 
on existing agri-environmental schemes, we expected very conservative attitudes about agri-
environmental  reforms.  The  results  show  a  different  picture.  Farmers  are  sensitive  to  the 
environmental impact of their agricultural practices.  
 
The majority of them acknowledges that agri-environmental schemes should be specifically 
designed to encourage or to maintain more environmentally practices and that income-support 
is not a primary objective. Finally they are surprisingly favourable to an allocation system 
which would allow more flexibility in the design of contracts. These results encouraged us to 
investigate further on the payment rules that would be acceptable. 
 
4. A choice-experiment to assess farmers’ preferences on payment rules 
4.1. The choice-experiment design 
The underlying structure of the last section of the survey is a choice experiment in which 
interviewed  farmers  had  to  elicit  their  preferred  payment  rule.  Choice  experiment  is  a 
methodology  based  on  stated  preference.  It  is  based  on  choice  sets  presenting  different 
scenarios combining different attributes with different levels. For each choice set, respondents 
select their preferred scenario (Louvière, 1988, 1992, Adamowicz et al, 1994, Hanley and 
Mourato, 2001).    12
 
We have adapted this method to compare different payment rules: payments in favour of 
farmers having the greatest financial needs, payments compensating the largest compliance 
costs and payments rewarding the greatest environmental contribution.  The design of  the 
questionnaire is the following: 
    
Each choice is described by the comparison of two hypothetical farmers, farmer A and farmer 
B. These farmers are located in the same area, they have identical farming activities, and they 
sign up for the same agri-environmental contract (same commitment, on an equivalent area, 
and for the same period). However, for reasons which are not explained in the survey – but 
are presented as independent of the farmer’s will or capacity -, they can differ with respect to 
four attributes. Three attributes describe the farmer’s situation (descriptive attributes): level of 
financial  needs,  level  of  compliance  costs  with  the  agri-environmental  contract,  level  of 
environmental  benefit  provided  by  the  implementation  of  the  contract;  and  one  attribute 
describes the level of agri-environmental payment (payment attribute). For each of these four 
attributes, three comparative situations (levels) are possible: farmers A and B have the same 
attribute level, farmer A’s attribute is greater then farmer B’s; farmer A’s attribute is lower 
than farmer B’s. The comparison is made only on the basis of ordinal ranking. No measure of 
difference intensity is provided. 
 
Respondents are presented with 9 choice sets, which can be divided into three categories of 
three choice sets each. The first category describes a situation where the two farmers differ by 
only one descriptive attribute and by the payment attribute.  
Figure 1: Example of a choice set in category 1: Farmer A provides greater 
environmental benefits than farmer B. 
   
Farmer A  Farmer B    Farmer A  Farmer B    Farmer A  Farmer B   
Financial needs   
♦  ♦    ♦  ♦    ♦  ♦   
Compliance costs   
♣  ♣    ♣  ♣    ♣  ♣   
Environmental benefit   
♥♥  ♥    ♥♥  ♥    ♥♥  ♥   
Compensation payment   
♠ ♠  ♠    ♠  ♠ ♠    ♠  ♠   
No choice 
    Option 1    Option 2    Option 3    Option 4   13
In this choice set, four options are proposed and the respondent must select his preferred 
option. Farmers A and B have equivalent financial needs and identical compliance costs, but 
farmer A provides greater environmental benefits than farmer B (for example, his land is 
located next to a river, in a more vulnerable zone, and therefore, although his environmental 
effort is the same as farmer B, his contribution to the improvement of environmental quality is 
greater). In  option 1, farmer A gets a greater agri-environmental payment than farmer B. In 
option 2, farmer B gets a greater payment. In option 3, they get identical payments. Option 4 
is selected by the respondent when none of the three previous choices suits him. The two 
other choice sets describe the situations when farmers differ respectively by their compliance 
costs and by their financial needs. In this category of  choice set, we will call the first set 
“environmental gain difference, ED”,  the second set “compliance costs difference CD” and 
the last one “financial need difference, FD”.  
 
The second category describes the situation where farmers differ by two descriptive attributes, 
one displays a greater level for farmer A, the other one displays a greater level for farmer B.  
 
Figure 2: Example of a choice set in category 2: Farmer A has greater compliance costs 
than farmer B and farmer B provides more environmental benefits than farmer A 
    Farmer A  Farmer B    Farmer A  Farmer B    Farmer A  Farmer B   
Financial needs    ♦  ♦    ♦  ♦    ♦  ♦   
Compliance costs    ♣♣  ♣    ♣♣  ♣    ♣♣  ♣   
Environmental benefits    ♥  ♥♥    ♥  ♥♥    ♥  ♥♥   
Compensation payment    ♠ ♠  ♠    ♠  ♠ ♠    ♠  ♠   
No choice 
    Option 1    Option 2    Option 3    Option 4 
 
 
The two other choice sets of the second category describe the situations when farmers differ 
simultaneously by their compliance costs and financial needs; and by their financial needs and 
environmental benefits. In this category of  choice set, we will call the first set “compliance 
costs and environmental gain difference on both sides, CED1” , the second set “financial need 
and compliance costs difference on both sides FCD1” and the last one “financial need and 
environmental gain difference on both sides, FED1”.    14
  
The third category describes the situation where farmers differ by two attributes, with the 
greater levels of the two attributes being observed for the same farmer. 
 
Figure 3: Example of choice set in category 3: Farmer A has greater compliance costs 
and provides more environmental benefit than farmer B  
    Farmer A  Farmer B    Farmer A  Farmer B    Farmer A  Farmer B   
Financial needs    ♦  ♦    ♦  ♦    ♦  ♦   
Compliance costs    ♣♣  ♣    ♣♣  ♣    ♣♣  ♣   
Environmental benefits    ♥♥  ♥    ♥♥  ♥    ♥♥  ♥   
Compensation payment    ♠ ♠  ♠    ♠  ♠ ♠    ♠  ♠   
No choice 
    Option 1    Option 2    Option 3    Option 4 
 
The two other choice sets of the second category describe the situations when farmers differ 
by their compliance costs and financial needs; and by their financial needs and environmental 
benefits.  In  this  category  of    choice  set,  we  will  call  the  first  set  “compliance  costs  and 
environmental gain difference on the same side, CED2” , the second set “financial need and 
compliance costs difference on the same side FCD2” and the last one “financial need and 
environmental gain difference, on the same side FED2”.  
 
 A  discrete  choice  model  is  used  to  analyse  the  preference  of  farmers  for  payment  rules,  
within a utility maximization framework. The basic  assumption here is that farmers choose 
the payment rule which provides them with the highest utility. The utility is described by 
random utility theory, as a function of variables describing the nature of differences between 
the two farmers as well as a random error component that captures unexplained variance in 
the farmer’s utility function. 
ij j ij U X b e = +                                                                                                                           (1) 
where  ij e  represents the stochastic component of farmer  i ’s utility for criterion  j , and  b  
and  j X  are respectively the vector of parameters and the matrix of variables describing the 
differences between the two farmers.   15
We model the probability that farmer  i chooses the payment rule j  from the total set of 
payment rules  J . It is equal to the probability that the utility provided by  j  is higher than the 
utility of another payment rule 
' j :  
( ) ( ) ( ) '
' ' / , ij ij p j J P U U j j j J   = > " ¹ Î
                                                                             (2) 
( ) ( ) ( ) ' '
' ' / , j ij j ij p j J P X X j j j J b e b e   = + > + " ¹ Î                                                        (3) 
( ) ' '
' ' ' ' / , ij j ij j p j J P X X j j j J e e b b   = - < - " ¹ Î                                                             (4) 
This probability can be estimated with a multinomial logit model which assumes that the error 
terms in the farmer utility function are independently and identically distributed as Gamble 
variable  (Dellaert  et  al,  1999),  leading  to  the  following  closed  form  expression  for  the 
probabilities: ( ) ( ) ( ) ' / exp / exp j j
J
p j J X X b b = ∑                                                               (5) 
 
For the next analyses, we will use a simpler model based on a binary-choice logit estimated 
with the responses on the first category of choice set (describing a situation where the two 
farmers differ by only one descriptive attribute, n=96). It allows to compare the preference of 
farmers for uniform payments, relative to differentiated payments.  We estimate the model for 
the dichotomous dependent variable  i Y  taking two values indexed as follows: 
 
  
0 if the farmer choose a differentiated payment






   
In the binomial logit model, we use three dummy variables FD, CD and ED to describe the 
differences between the two farmers:   
- FD  takes value 1 when the two farmers differ by their financial needs, 0 otherwise  
- CD takes value 1 when the two farmers differ by their compliance costs, 0 otherwise. 
- ED takes value 1 when the two farmers differ by the environmental benefits they provide, 0 
otherwise.   16
 
To avoid the variable dummy trap, the variable FD is used as reference category and dropped 
from the model.  
 
4.2. Preferences for uniform versus differentiated payments 
Table  4  shows  that  when  the  two  farmers  differ  by  only  one  attribute,  the  choice  of 
respondents  is  clear-cut.  For  FD,    28%  choose  a  uniform  payment,  while  72%  and  78% 
choose a differentiated payment for respectively CD and CE. It indicates that respondents 
think that an additional payment is more justified to compensate greater compliance costs or 
to reward greater environmental benefits than to mitigate financial needs.   
 
The statistics of the responses to the second category of choice sets (CED1, CFD1, FED1) are 
less  clear-cut.    Responses  in  favour  of  a  differentiated  payment  fall  down  to  54%  of  all 
responses.  For the third category of choice sets (CED2, CFD2, FED2), the results show a 
very strong majority of respondents in favour of  differentiated payments. 
 
Table 4: Choice of differentiated payments 
Variables   % of respondents choosing  
differentiated  payments   
FD  28 
CD  72 
ED  78 
CED1  50 
FCD1  40 
FED1  47 
CED2  87 
FCD2  75 
FED2  78 
 
The  results  obtained  from  the  dichotomous  logit  model    are  presented  in  table  7.  The 
likelihood ratio chi-square of 24.21 (with a p-value of 0.00) indicates that the model as a 
whole fits significantly better than an empty model. The pseudo R
2 – an analogous measure of 
goodness of fit - is eqal to 0.19 which is reasonable for analysis based on cross sectional data 
(Greene,  1997,  p  683).  Alternatively,  the  goodness  of  fit  is  illustrated  by  the  correct 
predictions’ percentage, which amounts to 76%.   17
Table 5: Estimated coefficients, odds ratios and marginal effects 
Explanatory variables  Estimated coefficients  Odds ratios  Marginal effects 










Constant  - 
(**) 
-  - 
    ** (p<0.01) *(p<0.05) 
    Percentage of correct predictions: 76% 
    Number of observations = 96 
    Pseudo-R
2 = 0.19 
 
The positive signs of the significative estimated coefficients in table 5 confirm the intuitions 
provided by the statistics in table 4: the choice of a differentiated payment is influenced more 
by environmental gain difference and by compliance costs differences between farmers than 
by financial needs difference. 
 
The odds-ratios show that the probability of  choosing a differentiated payment is 6.53 times 
greater than the probability of choosing a uniform payment when farmers differ with respect 
to their compliance costs.  When there is environmental benefit difference between the two 
farmers, the probability to choose a differentiated payment increases by 13.8 times compared 
to the situation when they differ with respect to financial needs.  The marginal effects column 
confirms  this  result  showing  that  a  difference  in  environmental  benefit  increases  the 
probability of choosing a differentiated  payment by 56% compared to the situation where 
there is no difference in environmental benefit. A difference in compliance costs increases the 
probability of choosing an adjusted payment by 43%.  
 
From these results, we can conclude that farmers prefer a differentiated  payment in order to 
take into account differences between farmers in terms of compliance costs or environmental 
benefits than differences in financial needs. Furthermore, farmers are more likely to require a 
greater payment for  a greater environmental benefit than for greater compliance costs.  This 
result is slightly at odds  with the responses of farmers on the objectives of agri-environmental 
schemes (see table 3 section 3.2): only a minority defended the principle of a scheme that 
would target compensations to farmers providing the greatest environmental contribution.   18
  
4.3. Extension 
We use the same dichotomous logit model to compare the preferences of farmers for uniform 
payments, relative to differentiated payments but we add data obtained from the responses of 
the second and third choice sets. This allows us to test if  preferences for one payment rule, 
observed when farmers differ only by one attribute, are confirmed when farmers differ by two 
attributes (n=288).  
 
To avoid the dummy trap, CD, FCD1 and FCD2 are used as reference categories and dropped 
from  the  model.  Thus,  the    following  interpretation  of  estimated  coefficient  is  made  by 
comparison with these three reference categories.   
 
The  results  are  presented  in table 6. The correct predictions’ percentage amounts to 68% 
which  indicates  a  reasonable  goodness  of  fit  but  only  three  estimated  parameters  are 
significantly different from zero. This is mainly due to the lack of heterogeneity of responses 
in the third category choice set (see last three lines of table 4).  
 
The  estimated  parameters  for  FD  and  ED  confirm  the  results  presented  in  table  5  on  a 
restricted  data  set:  the  financial  needs  difference  decreases  the  choice  of  differentiated 
payment  while  the  environmental  gain  difference  increases  it,  compared  to  a  situation 
displaying  differences  in  compliance  costs.  The  odds-ratios  show  that  the  probability  of  
choosing a differentiated payment is 3.24 times greater than the probability of choosing a 
uniform  payment  when  there  is  a  difference  in  environmental  benefit  alone  (ED=1)  or 
associated to a cost compliance difference (CED2=1). When there is a difference in financial 
needs (FD=1), the probability to choose a differentiated payment is 0.23 times lower than 
when there is a difference in compliance cost alone (CD=1) or associated to environmental 
differences for the same farmer (FCD2=1) or separately for the two farmers (FDC1=1). The 
marginal effects column confirms that when there is a difference in environmental benefits 
(ED=1)  or when it is reinforced by a difference for the same farmer in compliance costs 
(CED2=1),  then the probability of choosing a differentiated payment increases by 21%.  A   19
difference in financial needs decreases the probability of choosing a differentiated payment by 
34%.  
Table 6: The estimated coefficient, the odds ratios and the marginal effects 
Explanatory  variables  Estimated coefficients  Odds ratios  Marginal effects 
FD  -1,44**  0,23**  -0,34 
ED  1,17*  3,24*  0,21 
FED1  -0,63  0,52  -0,15 
CED1  -0,63  0,52  -0,15 
FED2  -0,76  2,14  0,15 
CED2  1,17*  3,24*  0,21 
Constant  0,51  -  - 
    ** (p<0.01) *(p<0.05) 
    Percentage of correct predictions: 68% 
    Number of observations = 288 
    Pseudo-R
2 = 0.1 
 
 
Table  7  calculates  simple  percentages  which  provide  additional  insights  into  the 
“competition” between the three types of agri-environmental payment rules when one rule 
justifies  greater  payments  to  farmer  A  whereas  another  rule  justifies  greater  payments  to 
farmer B (responses from category 2 of choice sets).  
 
Table 7: Frequency of the payment rule choice 
Variables  Frequency  
If FED1=1  31%  of  respondents  choose  to  allocate a greater payment to the farmer providing greater 
environmental benefits 
16% of respondents choose to allocate a greater payment to the farmer facing greater financial 
difficulties 
53% of respondents choose to allocate the same payment to both farmers.  
If FCD1=1  41  of  respondents  choose  to  allocate  a  greater  payment  to  the  farmer  displaying  higher 
compliance costs 
0% of respondents choose to allocate a greater payment to the farmer facing greater financial 
difficulties 
59% of respondents choose a payment to allocate the same payment to both farmers. 
If CED1=1  19%  of  respondents  choose  to  allocate a greater payment to the farmer providing greater 
environmental benefits. 
28%  of  respondents  choose  to allocate a greater payment to the farmer displaying higher 
compliance costs. 
53% of respondents choose to allocate the same payment to both farmers. 
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The table 7 shows that when differences between farmers require to establish a hierarchy 
between payment rules, then more than half of the respondents prefer not to choose and select 
therefore  a  uniform  payment.  However,  for  the  respondents  who  choose  a  differentiated 
payment, the relative percentages of responses indicate the following ranking: what justifies a 
greater payment is (1) first a higher compliance cost, (2) second, a greater environmental 
benefit,  (3)  and  finally  larger  financial  needs.  This  last  result  confirms  only  partially  the 
previous analysis (table 6): it reinforces the evidence that financial needs are not a priority 
criterion to calculate agri-environmental payments. However, it also shows that the hierarchy 
between the compliance cost rule and the environmental benefit rule is not clear-cut, and that 
almost half of respondents value them equally. There is therefore a need to organize more 
interviews in order to extend the data base and to be able to conduct the polynomial logit 
analysis described in section 4.1. 
 
5. Conclusion and perspectives 
Agri-environmental schemes are based on the voluntary provision of environmental services 
by farmers. Countries like the United States and Australia have experimented several ways to 
allocate agri-environmental contracts in order to make efficiency and budgetary gains. The 
European Commission is also envisaging reforms. In this context, it is important to measure 
the acceptability by farmers of new allocation and payment rules. This paper provides insights 
on these issues, based on a survey with Lozerian farmers.  
 
The main result of the survey is that Lozerian farmers, although their farm revenues are very 
dependant on the existing agri-environmental scheme (especially the grass premium),  are 
open  to  changes  in  payment  rules.  First  of  all,  they  are  a  majority  to  agree  that  agri-
environmental measures should be specifically designed to compensate additional costs of 
adopting more environmentally-friendly techniques, and are not justified as income-support 
measures. Second, an important majority also prefer more flexible allocation system in which 
technical recommendations and payments reflect better individual characteristics. At last, a 
simple choice modelling shows that they favour payment rules providing greater payments to 
farmers  providing  greater  benefits  and  displaying  larger  compliance  costs.  However,  the 
results do not allow to establish a clear ranking between these two criteria.   
   21
The conclusion is twofold: for agri-environmental measures whose objectives are to maintain 
existing practices –and which therefore do not provide additional environmental benefits and 
do not impose additional costs on farmers, a  uniform payment is preferred. However, for 
agri-environmental  measures  imposing  genuine  changes  in  farming  systems,  it  seems  that 
farmers are willing to accept new procedures reflecting better their differences. A competitive 
bidding, including a bid-ranking rule based on a performance index including both costs and 
environmental contributions, could be envisaged. This preliminary study seems to indicate 
that it could respond to farmer’s expectations.  
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